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Abstract. A number of privacy risks are inherent in the Smart TV
ecosystem. It is likely that many consumers are unaware of these privacy
risks. Alternatively, they might be aware but consider the privacy risks
acceptable. In order to explore this, we carried out an online survey
with 200 participants to determine whether consumers were aware of
Smart TV related privacy risks. The responses revealed a meagre level of
awareness. We also explored consumers’ attitudes towards specific Smart
TV related privacy risks.
We isolated a number of factors that influenced rankings and used these
to develop awareness-raising messages. We tested these messages in an
online survey with 155 participants. The main finding was that partici-
pants were generally unwilling to disconnect their Smart TVs from the
Internet because they valued the Smart TV’s Internet functionality more
than their privacy. We subsequently evaluated the awareness-raising mes-
sages in a second survey with 169 participants, framing the question dif-
ferently. We asked participants to choose between five different Smart
TV Internet connection options, two of which retained functionality but
entailed expending time and/or effort to preserve privacy.
Keywords: Smart TV, Privacy, Risks, Human Factors, Consequences
1 Introduction
Smart TVs are a relatively recent innovation that, in addition to streaming tra-
ditional broadcast content, facilitate access to Internet content and services as
well as video-on-demand, games and infotainment. At first glance, Smart TVs
seem to deliver distinct added value, as compared to traditional televisions. A
closer look reveals a number of privacy risks in the Smart TV ecosystem: (1)
vendors and broadcasters routinely collect and share Smart TV usage-related
data [45,19,15], (2) many vendors record and analyze speech by transmitting it
to third party services to extract commands for operating the TV [26] and (3)
Smart TVs are less reliably secured than desktop computers and smartphones,
[27]. In effect, consumers connecting their Smart TVs to the Internet are, per-
haps unwittingly, sacrificing their privacy. There seems to be little pressure from
consumers to force vendors and broadcasters to respect their privacy. Two expla-
nations are possible: (1) consumers are unaware of the privacy risks and/or (2)
consumers are aware of the risks but consider them acceptable or too unlikely
to be concerned about.
The primary aim of our research was first to assess general awareness of
these privacy risks. We discovered a poor level of awareness, so we proceeded
to develop strategies to improve consumer awareness and also to explore the
likelihood that consumers would be prepared to act to protect their privacy.
Our research project’s phases were as follows:
First, we explored general levels of consumer awareness of risks using an
online survey. This included understanding which particular risks were consid-
ered critical, and why. This online study with 200 participants confirmed a low
level of general awareness. From the participant responses we derived factors
that clearly influenced participants’ risk judgments. We then used these factors
to craft effective awareness messages to be used in phase two.
Second, using an iterative approach, we developed two awareness messages
based on the factors we isolated during the first phase, and evaluated them.
One message raised awareness of usage data collection and analysis. The other
did this, but also flagged the possibility of their usage data being misused. We
conducted an online study with 155 participants to test the impact of these
messages, as measured by their willingness to disconnect their Smart TVs from
the Internet. Most participants were unwilling to do this. The most commonly-
mentioned reason for this was the fact that they wanted to retain the Smart TV’s
Internet functionality. Even though we increased awareness of privacy risks, they
valued the Internet functionality so much that the risks did not seem to concern
them.
Third, we tested whether privacy-aware consumers would be willing to spend
time and/or money in order to preserve their privacy, all the while retaining the
TV’s Internet functionality. We presented participants with a privacy-protection
mechanism such as the one proposed by Ghiglieri et al. [19]. This mechanism
installs broadcaster and vendor privacy protection before the Smart TV is con-
nected to the Internet. Internet functionality is unhindered but the consumer’s
privacy risk is reduced. 169 people participated in a study to explore reactions
to, and acceptability of, this mechanism. Most participants declared themselves
willing to deploy this kind of privacy-protection mechanism.
Our main findings are as follows:
– We confirmed a generally low level of awareness of privacy-related risks in
the Smart TV context.
– Some participants were aware that data was being gathered and analyzed,
but unaware of the potential for misuse.
– Making participants aware of potential misuse is more effective than only
making them aware that data is collected and analyzed by vendors (whom
they may trust).
– Raising awareness, in and of itself, is insufficient. Together with awareness,
people also need the means to preserve their privacy.
– Expecting people to forego all Internet functionality is unrealistic. However,
they express a willingness to spend time and/or money on privacy protection
as long as they can retain Internet functionality.
In conclusion, it is clear that research into the development of usable privacy
enhancing technologies (PET), providing an improved level of privacy preserva-
tion while retaining functionality, is required. Awareness-raising, on its own, is
insufficient.
2 Background
Publications and media have shown that Smart TV consumers are exposed to
privacy risks such as the collection and analysis of usage data for various pur-
poses. A blog [9] revealed that the privacy policy of LG contains a correspond-
ing statement; Samsung’s [34] and Sony’s [37] privacy policies also contain such
statements. Furthermore, published studies [18,19,16,14] showed that the In-
ternet functionality HbbTV has been also used to profile consumers without
consumer’s consent. HbbTV is a standardized technique that covers video-on-
demand and information services for Smart TVs provided by the broadcasters.
It is supported by 97% of the current available Smart TVs [35], in Germany,
the country in which this research was conducted. According to the Smart TV
working group of the German TV-Platform [1] a worldwide usage of HbbTV is
being contemplated. Europe has the highest coverage as of today. Other pub-
lications have shown that even the (traditional) broadcast channel of the TV
signal is vulnerable and can be manipulated so that it can transport malicious
data to Smart TVs in a specific regional area (e.g. manipulating HbbTV in Oren
et al. [30]). Furthermore, Miche´le et al. [27] showed that Smart TV media play-
ers could enable TV hacking and allow secret access to camera and microphone
data streams. Indeed, in Metro [33], a news paper, it was reported that a couple
was recorded in an intimate situation by hackers. The recorded video was pub-
lished. More vulnerabilities have been revealed: Smart TV Apps [28], Vendor
transferred voice data unencrypted [5] and incorrect implementation of HTTPS
certificate validation [17].
3 Methodology — Consumer Awareness
We describe the study design, recruitment and ethics as well as the methodology
for the evaluation of the free text answers for the online survey to explore levels
of consumer awareness of risks.
3.1 Study Design
It comprised the following steps (see Figure 1):
Welcome and introduction. First, participants were informed that the survey
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related 
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Fig. 1. Study Design.
focused on Smart TVs. They were not briefed about the exact focus of the survey
so as not to prime their responses. Information about the duration was provided,
as well as the fact that there were no wrong answers.
Smart TV related demographics. Participants were asked whether they
owned a TV. Those who did were informed what a Smart TV is and asked
whether their own TV was smart. Those who did not own a Smart TV were
asked whether they would like to own one. Only those who owned a Smart TV,
or wanted to own one, continued. The remaining participants were forwarded to
the “Thank you” page.
Awareness of Smart TV related risks: Participants were asked to enumerate
Smart TV risks they are aware of. Afterwards, they could name measures that
could be used to counteract these risks.
Judging information about privacy risks. Participants were given four dif-
ferent risks to contemplate, one per page, in random order. For each, participants
were asked to judge how critical it was. Options for the rating ranged from 1 ‘not
very critical’ to 3 ‘neutral’ to 5 ‘very critical’. The option ‘don’t know’ was also
available. They were asked to justify their ratings. The request for justification
appeared on the same page as the scenario description.
The displayed privacy risks were identified from the research literature and
public media (see Section 2). The following scenarios were presented to the par-
ticipants (we add one reference as an example reference for further information
about the corresponding attack):
– Broadcaster Profiling. The TV gathers information about how long, and
how often, you watch each channel. If the broadcaster offers multiple chan-
nels, it is possible that the usage information from different channels is ag-
gregated (see e.g. [14]).
– Vendor Profiling. The Smart TV vendor gathers information about how
you use the TV. For example, the vendor gets detailed information about
which apps you use. Furthermore, it gathers information about how long,
and how often, you use your TV (see e.g. [45]).
– Voice Recognition. If you decide to control your Smart TV with your voice,
anything you say is transmitted to, and analysed, by the vendor’s servers.
To provide this functionality, it is necessary to transmit all utterances in the
room, for processing by the vendor’s servers (see e.g. [26]).
– Surveillance Audio. Your Smart TV is equipped with a microphone. Out-
siders can gain access to the Smart TV and are able to activate it and listen
to all the conversations in your living room. You do not realize this (see e.g.
[27]).
Demographics. Participants were asked to provide information about gender
and age.
Thank you. Finally, we thanked participants for their support and they received
information on how to claim their monetary reward.
3.2 Recruitment
The study was conducted in Germany in December 2015. SoSciSurvey4 was used
as platform for the survey. The participants were recruited via clickworker5 which
is similar to Amazon Mechanical Turk but recruits in Germany instead of the
USA. We paid each participant who completed the survey, and did not provide
obvious nonsense answers, e2 per participant on that platform.. We measured
the average time with test participants. This was about twelve minutes. As
Germany has a minimum wage of e8.50 per hour e2 was fair payment.
3.3 Ethics
Guidelines on ethical issues regarding research involving humans are provided
by the host university. These guidelines were followed with respect to respondent
consent and data privacy requirements were met. Participants first read an in-
formation page on which they were assured that their data would not be linked
to their identity and that the responses would only be used for study purposes.
Furthermore, using SoSciSurvey ensured that data was stored in Germany and
thus subject to German data protection law. They were told that they could
withdraw at any time. Moreover, they were told that all answers were valid:
there was no such thing as a wrong answer. No debriefing was required.
3.4 Evaluation Methodology
We used open coding to analyze free text answers. We proceeded in the follow-
ing way: First, two authors analyzed the free text answers independently and
composed a list of codes. Furthermore, they clustered these codes in categories.
Afterwards, the categories were discussed and the authors agreed on one list of
categories as well as a mapping from code to category. These categories were af-
terwards applied to the free text answers by two authors. Then, the assignments
were compared and discussed to agree on the categories to be assigned. It was
possible to assign one answer to several categories.
Note, all studies were conducted in Germany and questions and quotes in
German were translated for inclusion in this paper.
4 http://www.soscisurvey.de
5 http://www.clickworker.com/
4 Results — Consumer Awareness
4.1 Sample
200 participants completed the survey. 8 were removed from the data set since
they entered implausible values (e.g. data and rating did not match, empty free
text fields all over the place). The survey group consisted of 104 females (54%)
and 87 males (45%); 1 (1%) did not provide gender. The youngest participant
was 19, the oldest 89 and the mean age was 38.9 years with a standard deviation
of 12.41.
14 participants (7%) indicated that they did not own a TV. Out of the 178
remaining participants who owned a TV, 127 (71%) have a Smart TV and 51
(29%) owned a non-Smart TV. 44 (86 %) of those who did not own a Smart
TV would like to have one but 7 (14%) did not. 171 participants completed the
survey with the questions about the scenarios.
4.2 Awareness of Risks
We assessed whether participants knew about Smart TV privacy risks. In total,
60 individual text fields for risks were cited. The average number of risks per
participant was 2.14 for those who mentioned at least one risk; overall 0.16. 28
(16%) participants mentioned at least one risk; 11 (11%) of the female partici-
pants who were asked to mention risks mentioned at least one.
We analyzed the 60 free text risk-related responses in terms of two aspects:
‘potential actions’ or ‘consequences’ of a risk. The most often mentioned po-
tential action was ‘collecting data’ (19 participants), ‘access to camera or mi-
crophone’ (17). The other categories are ‘access to sensitive data’ (4), ‘access
to network’ (3), and ‘TV manipulations’. These aspects were mentioned by 21
participants. The most often mentioned consequences of privacy risks are ‘per-
sonalized advertising’ (7) and ‘being robbed’ (3). The others are: ‘TV getting
too slow’ (2), ‘Child watches inappropriate content’ (2), ‘TV does not work’
(2) and ‘program could change’ (1). These consequences were mentioned by 12
participants.
We confirmed a general lack of awareness of privacy risks, and concrete con-
sequences thereof.
4.3 Risk Scenario Ratings
We analyzed how critical participants rated the displayed privacy risk scenarios.
Table 1 provides, for each scenario, (1) the number of participants who answered
‘I don’t know’, (2) the number of participants considered6, (3) the mean value
how critical the scenario is rated for all participants, all female/male partici-
pants, as well as those mentioning/not mentioning risks in the previous part of
6 Note, the total numbers differ as the number of people who answered ‘I don’t know’
may differ as well as those who were set to ‘not using’ differs from scenario to
scenario.
the survey. The ‘broadcaster profiling’ scenario was considered by most of the
participants as the less critical one (light gray) and the ‘surveillance audio’ one
as the most critical one (dark gray).
Table 1. How critical a scenario is rated for different subgroups of participants and
different scenarios. (available options were: from 1 ‘not very critical’ to 3 ‘neutral’ to
5 ‘very ‘critical’; and the option ‘don’t know’ was available; most critical is filled dark
gray and least critical light gray.)
Scenario
I
don’t
know
all female male Risks
No
Risks
Broadcaster
Profiling
4
2.82
(164)
2.66
(95)
3.06
(68)
3.19
(27)
2.74
(137)
Vendor Profiling 2
3.46
(168)
3.52
(95)
3.42
(72)
3.50
(28)
3.45
(140)
Voice
Recognition
10
3.97
(159)
3.99
(91)
4.00
(67)
4.07
(27)
3.95
(132)
Surveillance
Audio
4
4.69
(166)
4.75
(95)
4.67
(70)
4.64
(28)
4.70
(138)∑
20
3.74
(657)
3.73
(376)
3.79
(277)
3.85
(110)
3.71
(547)
4.4 Influencing Factors
In total 684 free text answers for the justifications, with more than 7,200 words,
were examined using an open coding approach. We identified the factors that
potentially impact the ratings related to privacy risks. The different factors are
explored in the following paragraphs:
Party who gathers the data is likely to be an influential factor because many
participants consider vendors and broadcasters collecting data to be acceptable:
e.g. “Vendor may take the data as long as there is no abuse”, “I consider broad-
casters to be secure”. However, criminals would use data to harm them (“On top
of that there is a danger of data being abused by criminals”).
The type of data is also likely to be an influential factor. Some participants
were not worried about the described privacy risk as they considered the ad-
dressed usage data to be unimportant, i.e. not worth protecting as compared to
other types of data: “Don’t care about usage data”, “Inspection of usage data
is relatively uncritical as long as there is no inspection of personal data such
as Skype conversations”, “Don’t mind as long as they don’t have access to per-
sonal data such as passwords or banking details”, “Inspection of usage data seems
uncritical”,“I don’t care about usage data”, “The danger of abuse is minimal”,
“Information about my usage behaviour can be passed on”.
Being aware that usage data collection constitutes a privacy risk might
have an influence. Some participants see no disadvantages (“There is no disad-
vantage for me”, “I think it has no negative effects on me”) or only consider the
advantages to vendors and broadcasters of collecting and analyzing usage data:
– More reliable viewing figures: “At least better than faked viewing figures”, “[..]
I don’t really like it, but, on the other hand, it would be a real improvement
in viewing figures”
– Better products: “Usage data is required in order to improve products”, “It
is important to support future development, because you can see which ap-
plications are used frequently and which not”.
On the other hand, other participants consider any collection of (usage) data a
privacy invasion ( “I totally decline any data-gathering”, “violates my privacy”,
“very bad, would violate my privacy a lot. If this happened,I would not feel very
comfortable”. ) as well as with terms like surveillance ( “I don’t want to be kept
under surveillance”) and profiling (“you can create a user profile”).
Even when they are aware of a privacy risk, being aware of possible misuses
might have an influence. Those who are aware of possible misuse mentioned
different types of misuse:
– Vendors generally misuse the data: “data can be abused”, “my voice could
be used without my knowledge”. Note, the last quote actually addresses an
interesting aspect: ‘without my knowledge’. However, this aspect was only
mentioned very rarely.
– Vendors sell data: “It is critical; I don’t want the vendor to sell my data. It
is a private affair”.
– Burglary: “It invades definitely my privacy, no one may want that. Burglars
can check if someone is at home or not. If yes, they can burglarize or check
if burglary would be worth at all on the basis of information obtained . If that
isn’t critical enough, I don’t know...”.
– Close a Deal: “With my voice someone could fake phone calls to confirm
orders or contracts. In addition, there is a risk that not only commands to
the Smart TV are recorded, but also private or business conversations are
recorded”.
– Espionage: “I would feel spied on”, “It isn’t ok if I, as a customer, am spied
on in this way. The legislature must do something”.
Most of these were only mentioned by one or two participants.
Considering personalized advertising as beneficial or irritating seems to
be an influencing factor:
– Some like personalized advertising since it suggests items of interest: “I’ll
benefit from the analysis of my usage behaviour as they provide me with
tailored advertisements and special programmes for me personally”.
– Others consider this to be a nebulous attempt to misuse their data: “Could
be evaluated for personalized advertisement and programs -¿ data may be
sold to other companies in the media group”.
People’s general privacy attitudes may also have an influence. Those partici-
pants who have a negative attitude towards any type of privacy violation are, in
general, more motivated to complain. Those who are more difficult to motivate
are those that:
– use the ‘nothing to hide’ argument: “I don’t talk about important things I
need to be concerned about”, “There is nothing I have to hide”,
– have become accustomed to privacy risks: “nowadays it is normal” , “You
don’t have to like it, but in a way it has been wildly implemented for some
years now, hasn’t it?”, “It’s the same problem with computers. If anybody
wants to be a criminal, there will always be a way”, “On the internet via
computer or smartphone data is saved as well”
– think it is unavoidable : “You can’t change it”,
In summary, the following factors influence consumer ratings: the party who
gathers the data; the type of data; awareness of the fact that (usage) data is col-
lected; being aware that collected data can be misused; personalized advertising
being considered beneficial, or not; basic attitudes.
5 Awareness-Raising Messages
In some pre-studies we tested a range of messages covering a combination of dif-
ferent influential factors (see Section 4.4). Some included concrete consequences
other were more high level; some referred to hackers, others to vendors and broad-
casters. We concluded that privacy-related awareness could best be prompted by
messages that avoid being too specific about a potential misuse as too specific
(e.g. burglary) is likely to be judged as low risk as it is considered as too unlikely
in this context. People need to be able to visualize the particular scenario and
believe that it could happen, i.e. it is realistic. Based on these pre-considerations,
we decided to evaluate the following messages:
– Simple awareness message. : The Smart TV vendor and the broadcasters
collect and analyze usage data (e.g., information about how, and how often,
you use your Smart TV).
– Advanced awareness message. In addition to the text from the ‘Simple
awareness’ Group: It cannot be ruled out that the gathered information ends
up in the wrong hands in order to harm you.
Next, we wanted to evaluate how effective these messages would be and test
whether the advanced message is more effective in terms of motivating partici-
pants to protect their privacy.
6 Methodology — Raising Awareness
In this section, we explain the study’s design and the recruitment process. The
ethical considerations and methodology were as described in Sections 3.3 and
3.4.
6.1 Study Design
The study applied a between-subjects design. Participants were randomly as-
signed to two groups that differed with respect to delivery of the above-mentioned
awareness messages. The first group saw the simple message and the second
group saw the advanced message. The study was proceeded through the follow-
ing steps (see Figure 2):
Demographics 
Smart TV 
related 
demographics
Selection of 
TV usage 
option
Thank 
you
Welcome 
and 
introduction
Fig. 2. Study Design.
Welcome and introduction: Participants were informed that the study fo-
cused on Smart TVs. They were not briefed about the exact focus so as not to
prime their responses. Information about duration was provided (up to 10 min-
utes) as well as the fact that there were no wrong answers. They were told that
they could leave the study at any point. However, only those who completed the
study earned a monetary reward.
Smart TV related demographics: Participants were shown information re-
lated to Smart TVs and asked whether they owned a Smart TV. Afterwards, we
presented information about Internet functionality and gave them some exam-
ples to illsutrate this. We then asked them to rate whether they use or would
like to use Internet-related functionality on their Smart TV on a regular basis.
Options ranged from 1 ‘does not apply at all’ to 5 ‘fully applies’.
Selection of TV usage option: Participants were shown one of the two above-
mentioned awareness messages followed by an appropriate explanation of the
message. Note that we did not call them simple or advanced. Participants were
asked which Smart TV usage option they would prefer. Because the only truly
reliable privacy protection option is not to connect the Smart TV to the Internet
the following two usage options were presented7:
1. ‘Privacy risk’ option: The Smart TV will be connected to the Internet.
2. ‘Privacy protecting’ option: The Smart TV will not be connected to the
Internet.
The Demographics and Thank you steps were as described in Section 3.1.
7 the category names (privacy risk/protection) are only used here and were not com-
municated to the participants.
6.2 Recruitment
The studies were conducted in June/July 2016. SoSci Survey and clickworker
were also used. We paid each participant who completed the studies and who
did not provide obvious nonsense answers according to the minimum wage of
Germany a fair monetary reward (i.e. e 1.40 for about 9 minutes). Furthermore,
we made sure that each clickworker could only fill out one of our Smart TV
related studies.
7 Results — Raising Awareness
We report on the sample as well as the effectiveness of the awareness messages
and the justifications.
7.1 Sample
155 participants completed the study. The study group consisted of 75 females
(49%) and 79 males (51%); 1 participant did not mention gender.
We only considered those participants who stated that they own a Smart
TV and who rated that they use Internet functionality regularly at least with 3
(ranged from 1 ‘does not apply at all’ to 5 ‘fully applies’).
82 (53%) participants owned a Smart TV and used Internet functionality
regularly. From these 82, 43 (52 %) were made aware that usage data is collected
and analyzed, i.e. were assigned to the ‘simple awareness’ group. The remaining
39 (48%) were assigned to the ‘advanced awareness’ group and were made aware
that, in addition to legitimate collection and analysis, the data could also be
misused to cause harm if accessed by criminals. The youngest participant in
the ‘simple awareness’ group was 18, the oldest 65 and the mean age was 32.63
years with a standard deviation of 10.21. The corresponding numbers for the
‘advanced awareness’ group are: the youngest 18, the oldest 57, mean age 35.05
and standard deviation 11.20.
7.2 Effectiveness of Awareness Messages
In the ‘simple awareness’ group, 8 (19%) stated that they would not connect
their Smart TV to the Internet anymore (‘privacy protecting’ option).
In the group ‘advanced awareness’, 15 (38%) participants selected this option.
For more details see Table 2.
We did the following χ
2
-tests: A significant improvement in the selection be-
havior could be shown between the groups ‘Simple awareness’ and ‘Advanced
awareness’; χ
2
=4.00, df=1, p=0.046, φ-coefficient=0.221. Note, no significant
difference could be found between males and females; ‘Simple awareness’: χ
2
=4.51,
df=1, p(exact)=0.06 and ‘Advanced awareness’: χ
2
=0.37, df=1, p(exact)=0.74.
Table 2. Effectiveness of both awareness messages
Simple awareness
group
Advanced awareness
group
Option female male
∑
female male
∑
# (%) Privacy risk option
17
(71%)
18
(95%)
35
(81%)
12
(57%)
12
(67%)
24
(62%)
# (%) Privacy protecting
option
7
(29%)
1
(5%)
8
(19%)
9
(43%)
6
(33%)
15
(38%)∑
24 19 43 21 18 39
7.3 Justifications
The following categories of justifications for keep using the Internet were identi-
fied:
Functionality is important: Participants valued the functionality they ob-
tained by connecting the Smart TV to the Internet. Example quotes are:
“A Smart TV without Internet isn’t useful” , “I don’t need a Smart TV without
Internet”, ,“If I own a Smart TV , I want to use [the Internet] functions”, “I love
the Internet”, “The Internet extends the functionality of Smart TVs”,
Some participants balanced privacy against functionality and functionality pre-
vailed. Example quotes are:
“I think that the advantages that I get when it’s connected to the Internet outweigh
the disadvantages”, “It is convenient to access the Internet on my Smart TV, but
there is a risk that personal data will be stored”
Don’t mind: Participants did not mind if usage data is collected and analyzed
by broadcasters and vendors for various reasons. Example quotes are:
“I don’t have any secrets in the selection of my programs”, “I don’t mind if my
usage data is passed on” , “[..] I don’t care if someone finds out that I watch porn.”
Resignation: Participants were resigned to this use of their personal data.
Example quotes are:
“I think nothing is wrong”, “Today, data is collected everywhere. The recording of
TV usage behavior is relatively innocent.”, “Since data is stored in the Internet
anyway. Moreover, it’s a advantage because the offers are getting more personal-
ized.” , “The risk always exists that data ends up in the wrong hand, [..].” “There
isn’t 100% protection” ,“The risk always exist that data ends up in the wrong hand,
[..].”
7.4 Discussion
This study’s results demonstrate that significantly more consumers would discon-
nect their Smart TV when they are made aware of the risks with the advanced
awareness message (with harm) as compared to the simple message (without
harm). Thus, for further awareness studies it is essential to communicate the
potential harm and not just the fact that data is collected and analyzed.
We also gained other insights into Smart TV consumer attitudes towards
privacy risks. Many would willingly sacrifice privacy in order to make use of
the Internet functionality of Smart TVs either because (1) functionality is more
important, (2) consumers do not mind sharing usage data or (3) consumers
are resigned to privacy invasions. Note, most participants inhabited the first
category.
Consequently, we were interested in whether the situation would change if
privacy tools were made available. We wanted to evaluate the effectiveness of
both messages in the presence of such a tool. In particular, we wanted to find
out whether the advanced message was still more effective in this context.
8 Methodology & Results — Offering Functionality
The recruitment was carried out as described in Section 6.2. The ethical consid-
erations and methodology were as described in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
8.1 Study Design
The design was similar to the first study. Participants were given options as
introduced in Section 6.1 and also an additional three other options8:
3. ‘Effort’ option: The Smart TV will not be connected to the Internet. It will
be used as an external monitor for a laptop that is connected to the Internet.
4. ‘Effort+cost’ option: A privacy-protection mechanism will be deployed to
prevent usage data collection while retaining Internet-enabled functionality.
It will cost e 20 and requires about 15 min to configure.
5. ‘Costs’ option: A privacy-protection mechanism will be deployed to prevent
the usage data collection while retaining Internet-enabled functionality. It
will cost e 40 and no additional configuration time is required.
The privacy protection mechanisms with costs/effort have not been marketed
as yet, but a prototype mechanism can be found in [19]. The ‘Effort+cost’ option
is supposed to be installed on an existing device (e.g., router) and the software
should be purchased for e 20 similar to regular protection software for PCs9.
The 15 minute configuration time is the average time a consumer may need to
configure software (install it, choosing the preferences and select the right Smart
TV Model). For the ‘Costs’ option, we considered a pre-configured bundle10 with
hard- and software which should be purchased for e 40.
8 We did not mention the names of the options in the study as presented here.
9 See e.g. https://www.amazon.com/dp/B010P91LYY (accessed 11 December, 2016).
10 See e.g. https://www.amazon.com/dp/B000BTL0OA (accessed 11 December, 2016).
8.2 Sample
169 participants completed the study. The study group consisted of 84 females
(50%) and 83 males (50%); 2 did not provide gender. 97 (53%) participants
owned a Smart TV and regularly used Internet-enabled functionality. From these
97, 45 (46 %) were assigned to the ‘simple awareness’ group and the remaining
52 (54%) were assigned to the ‘advanced awareness’ group . The youngest par-
ticipant in the ‘simple awareness’ group was 18, the oldest 68 and the mean age
was 36.44 years with a standard deviation of 12.08. The corresponding numbers
for the ‘advanced awareness’ group are: the youngest 18, the oldest 67, mean age
36.80 and standard deviation 12.20.
8.3 Effectiveness of Privacy Protection Availability
Table 3 reports the results for all participants. In both groups more than 67%
stated that they would be willing to spend time and/or money to get both
functionality and privacy. From the three available options, the effort and/or
cost options were preferred, especially in the ‘advanced awareness’ group (75%).
Table 3. Effectiveness of Both Messages
Simple awareness
group
Advanced awareness
group
Option female male
∑
female male
∑
# (%) Privacy risk option
6
(27%)
8
(35%)
14
(31%)
4
(15%)
8
(31%)
12
(23%)
# (%) w/o Internet option 1 (5%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%)
# (%) Effort option
3
(14%)
3
(13%)
6
(13%)
2
(8%)
4
(15%)
6
(12%)
# (%) Effort + costs option
7
(32%)
6
(26%)
13
(29%)
13
(50%)
12
(46%)
25
(48%)
# (%) Costs option
5
(23%)
6
(26%)
11
(24%)
6
(23%)
2
(8%)
8
(15%)
# (%) Costs and effort
related options
∑ 15
(68%)
15
(65%)
30
(67%)
21
(81%)
18
(69%)
39
(75%)
# (%) Privacy protecting
options
∑ 16
(73%)
15
(65%)
31
(69%)
22
(85%)
18
(69%)
40
(77%)∑
22 23 45 26 26 52
We applied the same χ
2
-tests as in the first study. No significant improvement
could be shown between the selection behavior of the ‘simple awareness’ and
‘advanced awareness’ groups; χ
2
=4.21, df=4; p(exact)= 0.373.
There were no significant differences between male and female selections; ‘simple
awareness’: χ
2
=1.53, df=4, p(exact)=0.96 and ‘advanced awareness’: χ
2
=4.83,
df=4, p(exact)=0.28.
8.4 Effectiveness of Offering Functionality
We observed a difference in the choosing behavior of Smart TV consumers com-
paring the first (two options) and the second study (five options). We analyzed
the differences between them. We found that an increased number of consumers
demonstrated a preference for a privacy-protecting connection method.
For this analysis, we combined the groups ‘w/o Internet’ and all effort and/or
cost groups from the second study to arrive at two groups. The distribution
after combining the four privacy-protecting options of the second study looks,
at first glance, like a random distribution, since 26 (27%) participants selected
the ‘Privacy risk’ option and 71 (73%) a privacy-protecting option. A 20 to
80 distribution would be expected under random choice circumstances. In the
first study, 59 (72%) wanted to retain the connection to the Internet and 23
(28 %) wanted to disconnect the Smart TV. Thus, the choice behavior differed
significantly from a random distribution (χ
2
=15.80, df=1, p¡0.001) with a clear
lean towards the ‘Privacy risk’ option.
Therefore, we interpret the choice behavior in the second study as a positive
effect. Proposing alternative options that protect the consumer’s privacy while
retaining Internet functionality seems the most promising approach.
9 Related Work
We report on related work in the following different areas:
Mental Models of Privacy and Security. Mental models can influence peo-
ple’s attitude, so we list some work in this field. Mental models in the context
of privacy and security have been studied from Camp [2], Dourish et al.[10] and
Wash [42] as well as in different concrete areas, such as smartphones from Ophoff
et al.[29], Volkamer et al.[41], Harbach et al. [22] and Elie [11], network secu-
rity from Solove[36], firewalls from Raja et al. [31], secure communication from
Friedman et al. [12], passwords from Weirich et al. [44], single sign on Gupta
et al. [20], anonymous credentials from Wa¨slund et al. [43] and Harbach et al.
[21], privacy settings from Debatin et al. [6], email encryption from Gaw et al.
[13], Renaud et al. [32] and Clark et al. [4]. In these areas, security and privacy
protection tools are increasingly available. The focus of these papers differs from
this work, since mental models should help us to understand why the existing
tools are not used. We explored how consumers thought about Smart TV secu-
rity and privacy risks in order to establish effective and acceptable protection
measures. However, there are parallels. Some reasons for not using security tools
might be reasons that consumers do not complain if corresponding tools are not
available or vendors and broadcasters collect usage data intentionally.
Attitudes towards Privacy and Security. People’s privacy attitudes often
differ from the decisions they make. This inconsistency is called ‘privacy para-
dox’ . This issue has mostly been highlighted in the context of online privacy,
e.g., from Trepte at al. and Dienlein [39,7,38,40]. In the context of Smart TVs,
we experienced similar issues. Consumers claimed that privacy was important,
but most of them also connected their Smart TVs to the Internet without any
qualms.
Privacy Calculus. The privacy calculus theory is one way to explain users’
privacy behaviour (referred to as privacy paradox). It states that people seek a
balance between potential risks and benefits, e.g. in e-commerce from Dinev et
al. [8], in online market places from Kim et al. [23] or from Lankton et al. in social
networks [25,3]. We discovered that, in the context of Smart TVs, functionality
outweighs privacy concerns.
10 Discussion & Conclusion
We reported on three studies with a total 524 participants. They evaluated Smart
TV owner awareness, attitudes towards privacy risks and measures to preserve
privacy.
We had anticipated general lack of awareness. Our studies confirmed this.
Only 28 of the 171 (16%) participants in the first study mentioned a privacy risks
in their responses and only 12 (7%) were able to name concrete consequences of
privacy invasions.
We showed that Smart TV consumers were most likely to deploy a privacy
protection measure on their Smart TV when the measure did not impair available
functionality. They were willing to commit time and/or effort to protect their
privacy under these conditions. If functionality is restricted, on the other hand,
they are unlikely to deploy a privacy-protection measure. Thus, corresponding
usable technologies should be offered instead of purely making people aware of
the privacy implications of current technologies.
Furthermore, we find that significantly greater numbers of Smart TV owners
would disconnect their Smart TV when exposed to an awareness message that
mentions actual potential harm. Thus, awareness-raising endeavours should al-
ways incorporate mention potential harms of Smart TV related privacy risks.
Further findings were:
– Some of our participants had become so used to being profiled and observed
that they seemed to consider resistance futile.
– Others could only come up with the advantages of external agents collecting
their data.
– Others demonstrated a na¨ıve trust in vendors and broadcasters.
Limitations. All studies were conducted in Germany, where the population
tends to be more attuned to privacy concerns than citizens of other countries
[24]. A study with Americans, for example, might well deliver different awareness
levels and responses to privacy risks. The studies relied on self-report. Partici-
pants could have given false answers but since they were anonymous it is hard to
see that many would feel the need to disseminate or to fabricate responses. We
tailored surveys to reflect Smart TV privacy risks. A different set of scenarios
might well have revealed other factors and thus led to dissimilar messages.
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